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interest." 113 It is suggested that giving pay cablecasting room to grow is
more consonant with these directives than hindering it with highly
restrictive rules and regulations.
Jennifer Hess Asher

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

- CORRECTIONS - PRISONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURTS IMPOSES DUTY ON STATE TO PROVIDE
PRISON LAw LIBRARIES.

Bounds v. Smith (U.S. 1977)
North Carolina prison inmates filed three separate actions against state
officials under section 1983,1 alleging that they had been denied access to
the courts in violation of their fourteenth amendment rights by the state's
failure to provide legal research facilities. 2 The actions were eventually
3
consolidated in the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
which granted the inmates' motion for summary judgment. 4 The court
determined that the state's only prison library was "severely inadequate"
and that the inmates had no other available legal assistance.' Therefore, the
court concluded that the inmates' rights of access to the courts and equal
protection of the laws had been infringed.6 In view of the difficulty of
devising a remedy for this situation caused by North Carolina's decentralized prison system, 7 the district court accordingly "charge[d] the Department of Correction with the task of devising a Constitutionally sound
program" to assure inmate access to the courts.8 The state's proposed plan 9
113. Id. § 303(g).
1. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 818 (1977). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. 430 U.S. at 818.
3. The opinion of the district court was unreported. Upon its first consideration
of one of the consolidated actions, the district court had granted summary judgment
against the prisoners. 430 U.S. at 818 n.2. When the case was appealed, however, the
circuit court remanded, suggesting consolidation with the other two cases which were
pending in the district court at the time. Id.
4. 430 U.S. at 818.
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. The 13,000 inmates in North Carolina are housed in 77 prison units, in 67
counties. Sixty-five of the units hold fewer than 200 inmates. Id. at 818 n.3, citing
Brief for Petitioners at 7 n.3.
8. 430 U.S. at 818-19.
9. Id. at 819 & n.4. The state's plan called for seven libraries in prisons across
the state with smaller facilities at the Central Prison Segregation Unit and the
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for seven prison libraries across the state was accepted by the district court l °
over the inmates objections." On appeal by both parties, 12 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.' 3 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari 14 and affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit, holding
that states are constitutionally required to protect the right of prisoners to
access to the courts by providing them with libraries or alternative sources
of legal knowledge. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to review prison regulations or the acts of prison officials, an attitude termed the "hands off"
doctrine.' 5 This reluctance of the judiciary to become involved in the
corrections field appears to be based upon three rationales: 1) the theory of
separation of powers;' 6 2) the lack of judicial expertise in the field of

Women's Prison. Inmates would make appointments to use the library and be given
transportation and housing for a full day's work. Id. at 819. Books, legal forms,
writing paper, typewriters and copy machines would be available. Inmates trained as
legal assistants and typists would also be present. Id. The state estimated that
eventually 350 inmates per week would be able to use the library, although those
inmates not facing a court deadline might have to wait three to four weeks before
going to the library. Id.
The list of books included in the state's proposal was in compliance with the
list approved as the minimum collection for prison law libraries by the American
Correctional Association, American Bar Association and the American Association of
Law Libraries except for the omission of Shephard's Citations and local rules of court.
Id. at 819-20 n.4.
10. Id. at 820. The district court ordered two changes in the plan: 1) that extra
copies of the USCA Habeas Corpus and Civil Rights Act volumes be provided, and 2)
that no reporter advance sheets be discarded so that the libraries would slowly build
up duplicate sets. Id. at 820 n.6.
11. Id. at 819-20. The inmates claimed that the plan was totally inadequate, and
urged establishment of a library in each prison, inclusion of additional legal materials
and creation of a central circulating library. Id., at 820 & n.5.
12. Smith v. Bounds, 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1975). Both parties appealed from
orders adverse to them. The inmates asserted that the plan submitted by the state was
inadequate in that it failed to provide for an attorney's office to supplement the
library and that the library was not sufficiently extensive. Id. at 542. The state

contended that it was not obligated to provide prisoners with libraries or alternative

methods of obtaining such information and that the grant of summary judgment
requiring it to submit a plan for legal assistance was without merit. Id.
13. Id. at 545. The circuit court did not affirm in one respect. The Fourth Circuit
found that the plan denied women the same right of access as men, and ordered the
discrimination eliminated since it had no justification. Id. The state did not
subsequently challenge the sex discrimination ruling. 430 U.S. at 821 n.7.
14. 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
859 (1954); In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955 (1951);
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); Sturm v.
McGrath, 177 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1949); Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949);
Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
According to several commentators, this phrase was first used in a paper
prepared for federal prisons, FRITCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31
(1966); Goldfarb & Singer, RedressingPrisoners' Grievances, 39 G.W.L. REV. 175, 181
n.20 (1970). See generally Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
16. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
859 (1954) (court does not have power to supervise prison administration or to
interfere with prison rules); In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341
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penology; 17 and 3) the fear that intervention by the courts would subvert
prison discipline.I s The first erosion of the "hands off' doctrine occurred in
the area of prisoners' right of access to the courts. 19
This right was first expressly recognized in 1941 by the Supreme Court
in Ex parte Hull.1 In Hull, the Court invalidated a Michigan state prison
regulation which required that all documents that a prisoner wished to file
with a court be approved by the parole board's legal investigator before
being forwarded to the court. 2 ' Hull's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was found improperly drawn and therefore was not transmitted to the
court.22 In holding that "the state and its officers may not abridge or impair
petitioner's right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus" 23 the
Supreme Court emphasized that only the judiciary could determine whether
a petition was properly drawn. 24 Furthermore, the Court concluded that
although the state may have had a reasonable aim in promulgating this
rule, the individual's right of access to the courts must be accorded
25
paramount consideration.

U.S. 955 (1951) (not within province of courts to supervise treatment of federal
prisoners); Sturm v. McGrath, 177 F.2d 472, 473 (10th Cir. 1949) (court is without
power to superintend administration of or discipline in a penitentiary); Numer v.
Miller, 165 F.2d 986, 987 (9th Cir. 1948) (responsibility for prison discipline is vested in
the Bureau of Prisons, not in the courts).
17. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (correctional officials considered more fit than
judges to make decisions regarding prison administration). Cf. Carouthers v. Follette,
314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (court noted the greater experience of prison
administrators although holding in favor of the prisoners in their suit against the
officials).
18. See, e.g., Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952) (courts without power
to supervise or interfere with discipline of prisoners, they may only release those
illegally detained); Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (prisoner
denied right to sue warden of federal prison for failure to provide proper medical care
because allowing such actions would subvert prison discipline); Peretz v. Humphrey,
86 F. Supp. 706 (M.D. Pa. 1949) (not within province of court to interfere with prison
discipline).
For a discussion of the rationales for the "hands off" doctrine, see Fox,
Criminal Law - The FirstAmendment Rights of Prisoners,63 J. CraM. L.C.&P.S. 162
(1972); Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 15, at 181.
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). See also Turner, Establishingthe Rule of
Law in Prisons:A Manualfor Prisoners'Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 478
(1971).
20. 312 U.S. 546 (1941). The right of access to the courts has been described as:
the opportunity to prepare, serve and file whatever pleadings or other documents
are necessary or appropriate in order to commence or prosecute court proceedings
affecting one's personal liberty, or to assert and sustain a defense therein, and to
send and receive communications to and from judges, courts and lawyers
concerning such matters.
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 1961).
21. 312 U.S. at 548-49.
22. Id. at 547-48 n.1.
23. Id. at 549.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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The principle announced in Hull was subsequently expanded by the
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery. 26 Johnson involved a Tennessee
prisoner who had been transferred to a maximum security cell as
punishment for violation of a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from
assisting other prisoners in the preparation of writs. 2 7 In reversing the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that the regulation was void because it effectively barred illiterate
prisoners from obtaining writs of habeas corpus. 28 Thus, unlike the total
denial of access involved in Hull, 29 Johnson invalidated an impediment to
access to the courts by prisoners 0 The Johnson Court stated that "it is
fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of
presenting their complaints not be denied or obstructed."' 31 This right was
found to be superior to the state interest in preventing the admittedly
undesirable aspects of allowing "jailhouse lawyers" to function.3 2 The Court
concluded that inmate writ writing must be permitted "unless and until the
' 33
state provides some reasonable alternative.
26. 393 U.S. 483 (1968). Many of the barriers to indigent prisoners' access to the
courts were removed in the interim between Hull and Johnson. However, this result
was accomplished by a series of cases that did not deal with the right of access of
prisoners to the court. The leading decision in this series is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956). In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires that an
indigent prisoner be afforded the same opportunity to secure review of his conviction
as one who can afford to pay the costs of such review. Id. at 19. Therefore, the Court
determined that an indigent prisoner had to be provided with a free trial transcript or
other means of obtaining the same information. Id. at 20. In expanding the instances
in which indigents must be provided with free transcripts or alternative means of
obtaining an equivalent report, the cases which followed Griffin emphasized the equal
protection, rather than the due process, basis of that decision. See, e.g., Mayer v.
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Gardner
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaValee, 389 U.S 40 (1967); Long v.
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214
(1958). During this time period, the Court also removed the barrier of filing fees for
appeals and habeas corpus actions by indigent prisoners on equal protection grounds.
See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). An
additional right was afforded indigent prisoners in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963). In Douglas, the Supreme Court held that counsel must be appointed on
direct appeal for indigent inmates in order to provide them with the same
"meaningful appeal" available to those with funds. Id. at 357-58.
27. 393 U.S. at 484.
28. Id. at 487.
29. See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
30. 393 U.S. at 490.
31. Id. at 485.
32. Id. at 488. The Court in articulating the problem of prison writ-writers stated:
"It is indisputable that prison 'writ writers' like petitioner are sometimes a menace to
prison discipline and that their petitions are often so unskillful as to be a burden on
the courts which receive them." Id. (citation omitted). See Spector, A PrisonLibrarian
Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 365-67 (1968).
33. 393 U.S. at 490. The alternatives noted by the Court included plans in effect in
other states under which public defenders assist inmates, senior law students
interview and advise them, local attorneys provide assistance on a volunteer basis, or
an inmate is designated official prison writ-writer. Id. at 489 & n.10. The Court,
however, expressly declined to give an opinion upon these methods, id., merely stating
that "their existence indicates that techniques are available to provide alternatives if
the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates." Id. at 490.
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Since Johnson, the scope of the right to access to the courts has been
34
further defined by other Supreme Court decisions. Procunier v. Martine
invalidated a regulation which restricted prisoners' access to legal
assistance to members of the bar and absolutely barred the use of law
students and paralegals to interview inmates.35 In Wolff v. McDonnell,36 the
Court ruled that the right of access extends to civil rights actions brought
37
under section 1983 as well as to habeas corpus actions.
With regard to access-to lawbooks and libraries, lower federal courts had
held that inmates had no right to engage in legal research.3 8 As a result,
courts had refused to require prison officials to furnish prisoners with legal
materials or to allow them to use their own books3 9 This line of reasoning
was overturned by a per curiam decision of the Supreme Court in Younger v.
Gilmore.40 In Gilmore, the Court affirmed the holding of a district court
which enjoined the enforcement of a prison rule establishing an exclusive

34. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
35. Id. at 420-21. The Supreme Court reasoned that this rule restricted adequate
representation of indigent inmates since it is more expensive for a lawyer to interview
prisoners than for the lawyer's representative to do so. Id. at 420. Thus, indigent
inmates would be less likely to be able to obtain counsel and a substantial burden
would be imposed upon their right of access to the court. Id. For a more extensive
treatment of this case, see 52 J. URBAN L. 188 (1974).
36. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
37. Id. at 580. In Wolff, the Court remanded a section 1983 action brought by
prison inmates for determination of whether an inmate legal assistance program,
limiting prisoner aid to the prison legal assistant or others with the warden's
permission, met constitutional standards. Id. at 577-78. The Court answered
petitioner's claim that the holding in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1968), was
limited to habeas corpus actions by pointing out that the demarcation line between
the two actions is not always clear since there are instances in which the same
constitutional rights may be redressed under either form of action. 418 U.S. at 579.
Thus, finding "no reasonable distinction between the two forms of actions," the
Supreme Court held that on remand the district court was to apply the "reasonable
alternative" standard established in Johnson. Id. at 580. See also Nolan v. Scafiti, 430
F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) (right of access recognized in Hull and Johnson extended to
inmates using § 1983 action).
For a discussion of Wolff, see 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 345 (1975). For a discussion of
both Procunierand Wolff, see 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 377 (1975).
38. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
862 (1961); cases cited in note 39 infra.
For example, in Hatfield, inmates of a state penitentiary brought an action
under § 1983 seeking to enjoin officials from enforcing prison regulations limiting the
time and a place in which they could engage in legal research on the ground that it
denied their right of reasonable access to the courts. 290 F.2d at 634. While
recognizing such a right, the Ninth Circuit declined to hold that it had been violated
in Hatfield. Id. at 640. The court also noted in dictum that state authorities were under
no constitutional obligation to provide libraries for prisoners' use. Id. See Goldfarb &
Singer, supra note 15, at 240.
39. See, e.g., Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1973) (county sheriff not
required to supply law books so long as access to available books is not denied); Lee v.
Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) (prison not required -to provide materials to
prisoner for purpose of attacking presumptively valid conviction); Robinson v.
Birzgalis, 311 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (state not required to furnish legal
materials to prisoners); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7
(E.D. Pa. 1965) (where prisoner was permitted to obtain and retain his own legal
materials, lack of a library at prison was not a denial of access to courts).
40. 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
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list of lawbooks permitted in the prison.4 ' The Court offered no reasoning for
its decision,4 2 however, it has been suggested that by citing Johnson, the
Court established a connection between the right of access to the courts and
43
the right of access to legal materials and law libraries.
Against this historical background, the Court in Bounds began its
analysis by acknowledging that prisoners have a clearly established
constitutional right of access to the courts. 44 Justice Marshall, writing for
the majority, reasoned that not only must prisoners be assured a right of
access, but the access provided for must also be "meaningful. ' 45 Therefore,
the Court asserted that the state may be required to take on affirmative
46
obligations in order to assure prisoners' meaningful access to the courts.
In applying this reasoning to the instant case the majority rejected in
turn each of the petitioners' arguments. First, in response to the state's
assertion that a habeas corpus petition or civil rights complaint consists
only of a statement of facts giving rise to a cause of action and therefore
requires no research, the Court stated that since a lawyer would need to do
preliminary research before filing an initial pleading, so necessarily would a
pro se prisoner. 47 The Court similarly dismissed the state's claim that
prisoners would be unable to make good use of a law library by stating that
its experience had demonstrated that prisoners are capable of using
lawbooks to raise serious claims. 48 The majority also rejected the state's

41. Id. See Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 111-12 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub
noma. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). The district court accepted the inmates'
claim that indigent prisoners were denied meaningful access to the court as a result of
these regulations. 319 F. Supp. 108, 111. The court rejected the state's assertion, based
on Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961), that
access to lawbooks is a privilege rather than a right, stating that the right-privilege
distinction is eroding and that a prisoner is no longer regarded as a slave of the state.
Id. at 108-09. The state's claim that the regulations were valid because they were
based upon a legitimate state interest was similarly dismissed by the court on the
grounds that the right of access to the courts outweighed the state interest. Id. at 108,
111. The court concluded that "'[access to the courts', then, is a larger concept than
that put forward by the State. It encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner
might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary on all charges brought against
him or grievances alleged by him." Id. at 110. The state then appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court. 404 U.S. at 15.
42. The two paragraph opinion of the Court merely noted jurisdiction and stated
that the district court's judgment was affirmed. 404 U.S. at 15.
43. Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, Providing Legal
Services to Prisoners, 8 GA. L. REV. 363, 365 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legal
Services]. See text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
44. 430 U.S.-at 821, citing Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). See note 20 and
accompanying text supra.
45. 430 U.S. at 822. The majority reemphasized the principle that "'meaningful
access' to the courts is the touchstone." Id. at 823, citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,
611-12, 615 (1974). See note 26 supra; see also note 49 infra.
46. 430 U.S. at 824.
47. Id. at 825-26.
48. Id. at 826. The Court noted that this claim was inconsistent with the
representations which the state made in its application for funding from the Federal
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration which it had filed after the District
Court decision. Id. In that application, the state claimed that libraries would benefit inmates and reduce the number of groundless petitions and complaints. Id. at
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that libraries or legal assistance are unnecessary to assure

49
meaningful access in light of Ross v. Moffitt, where the Supreme Court had

refused to extend indigents' right to "meaningful appeal"5° to include
appointment of counsel for discretionary appeals.51 The Court distinguished
Ross from the instant case, observing that the former dealt with
discretionary review, while Bounds was concerned with collateral attack.5 2
The majority concluded that on discretionary review, the prisoner is likely to
have briefs from prior appeals and therefore has less need for legal
assistance than the inmate commencing an original action in order to
53
collaterally attack his conviction.
In addition, the Court stated that the instant decision was merely a
reaffirmation of its holding in Younger v. Gilmore.54 The majority reasoned
that Gilmore had clearly decided the issue of whether the state had an
affirmative duty to provide the means for access to the courts.5 5 The Court
noted that its experience under Gilmore had been satisfactory and suggested
no reason to change its mandate.5" The majority supported its decision not
to overrule Gilmore by citing cases in which the prisoner's right of access
was upheld in reliance on the holding in Gilmore.57 The Court also noted
821, citing Brief for Respondents at 3a. The majority also pointed out that this
proposition was inconsistent with the state's claim that prisoner access to the courts
is adequately protected by allowing inmates to help each other. Id. For a discussion of
whether inmates in fact derive a benefit from the state's provision of legal materials
without other forms of legal aid, see notes 79 & 80 and accompanying text infra.
49. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). In Ross, an indigent prisoner had been assisted at trial
and on appeal as of right by appointed counsel. Id. at 603. The prisoner sought to
have appointed counsel for his subsequent discretionary appeal to the state's highest
court and for his petition of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 603-04. The
Court denied his request, holding that the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment do not require appointment of counsel for discretionary
appeals because the indigent is not thereby being denied meaningful access to the
criminal appeals system because of poverty. Id. at 610, 612, 615.
50. See note 49 supra.
51. 417 U.S. at 612.
52. 430 U.S. at 827.
53. Id. at 827-28.
54. 404 U.S. 15 (1971). For a discussion of Gilmore, see notes 40-43 and
accompanying text supra. See also notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text infra.
55. 430 U.S. at 829. Notwithstanding this express reference to its holding in
Gilmore, the Court stated that Gilmore was not a necessary element of its analysis. Id.
at 828-29.
56. Id. at 829. The Court noted that most states have tried to fulfill Gilmore's
mandate by establishing law libraries, prison legal assistance programs, or both, and
that correctional administrators have supported the programs. Id. at 829-30 n.18
(citations omitted). See, e.g., Bluth, Legal Services for Inmates: Coopting the
Jailhouse Lawyer, 1 CAP. U. L. REV. 59 (1972); Carderelli & Finkelstein, Correctional
Administrators Assess the Impact of Prison Legal Services Programs in the United
States, 65 J. Crim. L.C.&P.S. 91 (1974); Sigler, A New Partnershipin Corrections,52
NEB. L. REV. 35 (1972).

57. 430 U.S. at 829, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578-79 (1974)
(although differing on other issues, the Court reaffirmed that Gilmore requires
provision of law libraries to prisoners); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 417 U.S. 17, 34 n.22
(1973) (Court cited Gilmore approvingly as removing barriers to appeal); Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (Gilmore cited with Court's approval as support for inmates'
right of access to courts); Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971) (issue of whether county
jails must provide prisoners with legal materials remanded summarily for consideration in light of Gilmore).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 9

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23

that law libraries were not the sole means of assuring meaningful prisoner
access to courts and that the rule developed in Gilmore did not foreclose
other alternatives. 58 In conclusion, the majority reiterated that the "hands
off' doctrine "cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid
constitutional claims." 59
The Bounds decision contains three dissenting opinions. Chief Justice
Burger submitted a separate dissent and also joined with Justice Stewart
and Justice Rehnquist in their dissents6 Chief Justice Burger's dissent
launched a two-pronged attack on the majority's reasoning. The Chief
Justice initially argued that since there exists no constitutional right to
collaterally attack a conviction rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, there can be no constitutional right of access to the court for such
collateral attack.6 1 Chief Justice Burger further maintained that if the right
of collateral attack is statutory in nature, the Supreme Court cannot impose
an affirmative duty upon the states to ensure that right.6 2 In such a

situation, the Chief Justice concluded, the duty imposed upon the states is
merely negative - not to interfere with the prisoners' exercise of the right.63
Justice Stewart, in dissent, stated that even if there is a constitutional
right of access to the courts, providing untutored prisoners with law libraries
would not contribute towards making access "meaningful. 6 4 Alternatively,
Justice Stewart maintained that if there were no constitutional right of
access then there can be no duty on the state to make access meaningful. 65
Justice Stewart also concluded that Gilmore was unpersuasive precedent
because of the unexplained analytical gap between the cited authority Johnson -

66
and Gilmore's actual holding.

Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent that there is no constitutional
right of prisoner access to the courts to attack convictions rendered by courts
of competent jurisdiction.6 7 He rejected the majority's analysis on the basis
that the Court misinterpreted the cases upon which it relied, none of which

58. 430 U.S. at 830. The alternatives suggested by the Court included: training of
inmates as legal assistants, use of paralegals and law students, organization of
volunteer attorneys, and the hiring of lawyers on a part-time or full-time basis. Id. at

831. The Court added that while experimentation would be encouraged, the plan must
remain within constitutional standards. Id. at 832.
59. Id., quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405. Justice Powell concurred in
the majority opinion, adding only the caveat that the Bounds decision "does not

purport to pass on the kinds of claims that the Constitution requires state or federal
courts to hear." Id. at 833 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 833-41.
61. Id, at 835 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice stated that "it is now
clear that there is no broad federal constitutional right to such collateral attack." Id.
(emphasis in original) citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). For a discussion of
Stone, see note 71 infra.
62. Id. at 834-35 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 834 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 836-37. Justice Stewart posited this situation due to its advancement by
Justice Rehnquist. Id. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
66. 430 U.S. at 836 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 837 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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recognized more than a physical right of access to the court. 68 In his view,
lawful incarceration results in a justified restriction of prisoners' constitutional liberties 69 and does not give rise to a right to collateral attack of that
7°
conviction in a federal court.
It is submitted that the Bounds decision presents several problems. The
first question that arises is whether there is in fact a constitutionalright of
access to the courts. 7 Although the Court bases its decision upon precedent
recognizing a right of access, the majority failed to elucidate the
constitutional source of that right. 7 Most cases have emphasized equal
68. Id. at 838-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Justice Rehnquist's interpretation,
Hull established only a physical right of Access to the court. Id. See text
accompanying notes 20-25 supra. He further asserted that the later cases relied on by
the majority depended either upon the theory that indigent convicts must be given an
opportunity to exercise a state-created right to appeal, see note 26 supra, or upon the
concept that the authorities cannot limit the prisoner's contacts with others, beyond
the fact of incarcerating him, simply because such contacts would aid him in
preparing a petition. Id. See text accompanying notes 26-33; notes 35 & 37 and
accompanying text supra. Since neither of these theories would apply to the provision
of law libraries, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the majority holding was not
supported by these earlier decisions. 430 U.S. at 839 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist added that had the state argued on equal protection grounds, "they
would nonetheless fail under Ross." Id. (citation omitted). For a discussion of Ross,
see note 49 and accompanying text supra.
69. 430 U.S. at 840 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974) (prisoners retain only those rights consistent with status as prisoner
and with the penal objectives of the prison); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)
(considerations underlying penal system justify restriction of many of prisoners'
privileges and rights).
70. 430 U.S. at 839-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. Chief Justice Burger contended that the majority's recognition of a
constitutional right of access contradicted the Court's holding in Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). 430 U.S. at 835 (Burger, C.J. dissenting). In Stone, the Court held
that where a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth
amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted habeas corpus relief on the
ground that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was introduced at his trial. 428 U.S.
at 494. However, it is submitted that Stone did not make it "clear that there is no
broad federal constitutional right to collateral attack" as Chief Justice Burger
maintained, but rather placed limits upon the instances in which the habeas corpus
remedy in particular may be used. Indeed, the majority in Stone stated in a footnote
that its holding was limited to the particular fourth amendment issue at hand. Id. at
494 n.37.
Moreover, it is submitted that Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the cases
would subject them to a very narrow reading. While Hull may be read as requiring
merely a provision for physical access to the courts, the meaning of "physical access"
must be determined. If it is simply the right to have a petition of some sort delivered to
the court, then the Bounds holding would be unnecessary under Hull. If, however, the
right of physical access includes the right to have an intelligible, legally proper
petition delivered to the court, then Bounds is clearly mandated by the Court's
decision in Hull.
The Johnson case, which favors the latter interpretation of the right of access,
is dismissed by Justice Rehnquist as depending upon the principle that the state may
not limit a prisoner's contacts beyond the fact of incarceration. 430 U.S. at 838-39
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). While Johnson is certainly amenable to such an
interpretation on its facts, the opinion of the Court focused on the meaningfulness of
the inmate's right to petition for post-conviction relief in the absence of some sort of
assistance. 393 U.S. at 489.
72. The source of the right of access to the courts has been viewed differently in
the various cases which have involved this question. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
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protection as its basis,73 but the Bounds majority did not rely on this
rationale. 74 Although it is generally accepted that a right of access exists,
this failure to identify its constitutional source weakens the reasoning of the
Court in reaffirming Gilmore's extension of that right to impose an
75
affirmative duty upon the states.
Assuming that the constitutional right of access exists, a second
troublesome question is whether the Supreme Court may impose an
affirmative duty upon a state to ensure the exercise of a federal right.
Bounds is subject to criticism for its deviation from the traditional
assumption that although a state may be required to refrain from interfering
with a federal right, it is not required affirmatively to ensure it.76 Several
Supreme Court decisions, however, have recognized an exception to the
states' passive role by requiring them to correct violations of a federal right
where the relief sought is prospective, such as would be the case in providing
prison libraries.7 7 However, the Bounds majority did not rely on the cases
(1956), and its progeny emphasized the equal protection guarantee as the basis for the
requirement of meaningful access to courts for indigents. See note 26 supra. See also
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974) (prisoners' right of access to the courts
based on due process); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (dictum) (prisoners have
right to access to petition for redress of grievances); Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d
1237, 1241 (2d Cir. 1972) (prisoners retain sixth and fourteenth amendment right of
access to the courts).
73. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1968); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
74. The Bounds majority did mention that equal protection was one of the bases
for the decision of the district court but did not utilize equal protection as the basis for
its own holding. 430 U.S. at 818.
75. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for
failing to identify the source of the right of access. 430 U.S. at 833-34. (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 839. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76. Chief Justice Burger took this position in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 834
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). In support of this proposition, the Chief Justice referred to
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (1974 amendments to Fair
Labor Standards Act which extended its minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions to state employees not within power granted Congress by the Commerce
Clause).
77. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), is regarded as the original recognition of
this exception. In Young, the eleventh amendment did not bar an action in federal
court seeking to enjoin the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing a statute
that allegedly violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 156-57. The injunctive relief
awarded, however, was merely prospective; the Attorney General was ordered to
conform his future conduct to the fourteenth amendment. Id.
This exception has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). In
Milliken, an undivided Court stated that the exception "permits federal courts to
enjoin state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law,
notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury." Id. at 2762,
citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 667.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), while supporting the holding in
Bounds, does not resolve the confusion over the Court's position on imposing an
affirmative duty upon the states. The award of retirement benefits to male employees
of the state who were discriminated against on the basis of sex was permitted in
Fitzpatrick despite the fact that such relief was retroactive. Id. at 456. The Court held
that Congress has the power to enter an award against a state for a violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V 1975), as a means of
enforcing the substantive guarantees of the fourteenth amendment in spite of
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that established this exception in addressing the affirmative duty issue;
rather the Court cited cases that had imposed such a duty without
explaining the source of the Court's power to make such an imposition.7 8
Moreover, even if there is a constitutional right of access which the
state must en3ure by its own expenditures, it is submitted that supplying
prisons with law libraries is not likely to achieve the goal of providing
prisoners with meaningful access to the courts. 79 Many inmates are
functionally illiterate or ill-equipped to make use of a law library. 8° Although
the majority suggested and even encouraged several "reasonable alternatives" to provision of libraries,81 legal aid is not mandated by the Bounds
eleventh amendment sovereign immunity. Id. However, Fitzpatrick may be distinguished from Bounds and Milliken because it dealt with congressional power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment by allowing suits against the state rather than the
courts' power to impose a burden upon the state. Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749,
2762 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 448 (1976).
For a discussion of the entire problem, see Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce
Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REV. 35 (1976). There,
the authors suggest that the Court should adopt a balancing test in tenth and
eleventh amendment cases in order to give effect to both federalism concerns and
individual rights, thus avoiding the confusion stemming from these cases. Id, at
71-72.
The Supreme Court apparently took a different stance on the affirmative duty
issue in Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977), decided shortly after Bounds. The Maher
case was brought by two indigent women who attacked a Connecticut Welfare
Department regulation that conditions receipt of medicaid benefits for abortions upon
a determination that they are medically necessary. Id. at 2378-79. These woman had
been unable to obtain a physician's certificate of medical necessity. Id. at 2379. The
Court held that the equal protection clause does not invalidate the regulation merely
because the state provides medicaid funds for childbirth. Id. at 2380-81. According to
the Maher Court, the state's only duty is to refrain from unduly burdening a woman's
constitutional right to freely choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 2382.
The regulation did not, according to the Court, place obstacles to an abortion in the
woman's path and therefore the state had no further affirmative obligation. Id. at
2382-83.
78. 430 U.S. at 825. The Court cited Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
(state must provide lawyers for indigent defendants at trial for misdemeanor);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state must provide indigents with counsel
on appeals as of right); and Gideon v. Wainwright, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent
criminal defendants have a constitutional right to appointed counsel at their trial in
state court). The Court also implicitly referred to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
when it acknowledged that "[s]tates must forgo collection of docket fees otherwise
payable to the treasury and expend funds for transcripts." 430 U.S. at 825. See note 26
supra.
79. See, e.g., Alpert, Prisoners'Right of Access to Courts:Planningfor Legal Aid,
51 WASH. L. REv, 563, 662-63 (1976); American Bar Association Joint Comm. on the
Legal Status of Prisoners, Tentative Draft of Standards Relating to the Legal Status
of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 377, 431 (1977); Legal Services, supra note 43, at
375; Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 15, at 236-38; Remington, State Prisoner
Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 ARiz. L.J. 549, 554-55.
80. In 1967, 82% of all prisoners had not completed high school and 55% had not
finished eighth grade. Legal Services, supra note 43, at 375 (citation omitted).
81. 430 U.S. at 830-32. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. Regarding
programs providing professional or quasi-professional assistance, the Court in
Bounds stated: "Such programs ... may have a number of advantages over libraries
alone ....
Legal services plans not only result in more efficient and skillful handling
of prisoner cases, but also avoid the disciplinary problems associated with writ
writers." 430 U.S. at 831 (citations omitted).
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decision. 82 It is submitted that the logical extension of the Bounds reasoning
would be to require that professional or quasi-professional assistance be
given to prisoners seeking to collaterally attack their convictions;8 3 the right
of access to the courts is a meaningless one if the tools provided for its
exercise are unusable by those most in need of its assurance.
Since Bounds is a reaffirmation of what most federal courts perceived to
be the mandate of Gilmore - that the state must provide law libraries or
some reasonable alternative to assure access to the courts - it is unlikely

that this decision will impose substantial new burdens upon state
treasuries. 84 The fact that a state may have the alternative of employing
volunteer programs to aid prisoners further supports this prediction. If,

however, the Bounds reasoning is extended in the future to its logical
conclusion that there is a right to appointed counsel for collateral attack, 5

the

impact upon state treasuries would be considerable.
The Bounds decision, although a reaffirmation of a prior decision,
articulates for the first time the nature of the duty imposed upon the state in
assuring prisoner access to the courts. Because it places an affirmative duty
on the state to assure a federal right, the case may well have ramifications

beyond the corrections field. 86 Thus, the right of the individual to require

82. Id. at 832. Although not mandated, it is submitted that legal services
programs may well be the "reasonable alternative" chosen by many of those states
without prison law libraries at present since volunteer programs may be less
expensive.
83. If Bounds were extended to provision of counsel for collateral attack, it is
likely, as suggested by Justice Rehnquist, that a conflict would arise with the holding
in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 430 U.S. at 840-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Ross held that there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for discretionary
appeals. 417 U.S. at 618-19. See note 49 supra. The criterion for obtaining the
discretionary review sought in Ross is a showing that the case is jurisprudentially
significant. 417 U.S. at 615-17. The Court in Bounds suggested that a prisoner is
likely to have briefs from prior appeals which could be reused to seek discretionary
review. 430 U.S. at 827, citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 615 (1974). A complaint
initiating a collateral attack, however, need only set forth a statement of the facts of
the case. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977). It is submitted that the prisoner is
equally unlikely to have an appellate brief addressed to the significance of his case as
he is to be able to articulate the facts of that case, and that the Court's distinction is,
therefore, an unpersuasive one.
84. The Court noted in Bounds that most states have made an effort to comply
with Gilmore by establishing law libraries or legal aid programs. 430 U.S. at 829. See
also Legal Services, supra note 43, at 423.
85. See 430 U.S. at 840-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that since the Court in Ross refused to extend the right to counsel to discretionary
appeals, it could be assumed that there is no constitutional right to counsel in a
collateral attack proceeding. Id. However, since under the majority's reasoning access
to the courts comprises the right to law libraries to pursue a collateral attack, he saw
"no convincing reason why it should not also include lawyers appointed at the
expense of the State." Id. at 841. See also note 49 supra.
86. The possibly limiting effect of Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376 (1977), upon the
impact of Bounds outside the field of corrections will need to be clarified by future
decisions. See note 77 supra. It is submitted that by holding in Maher that the state
merely has a duty not to interfere with a federal right but no duty to assure the
exercise of that right, 97 S. Ct. 2383-84, the Court would seem to be contradicting the
majority in Bounds.
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